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Abstract
Background: Since 2001, the District of Columbia Department of Health has been using an
emergency room syndromic surveillance system to identify possible disease outbreaks. Data are
received from a number of local hospital emergency rooms and analyzed daily using a variety of
statistical detection algorithms. The aims of this paper are to characterize the performance of these
statistical detection algorithms in rigorous yet practical terms in order to identify the optimal
parameters for each and to compare the ability of two syndrome definition criteria and data from a
children’s hospital versus vs. other hospitals to determine the onset of seasonal influenza.
Methods: We first used a fine-tuning approach to improve the sensitivity of each algorithm to
detecting simulated outbreaks and to identifying previously known outbreaks. Subsequently, using
the fine-tuned algorithms, we examined (i) the ability of unspecified infection and respiratory
syndrome categories to detect the start of the flu season and (ii) how well data from Children’s
National Medical Center (CNMC) did versus all the other hospitals when using unspecified
infection, respiratory, and both categories together.
Results: Simulation studies using the data showed that over a range of situations, the multivariate
CUSUM algorithm performed more effectively than the other algorithms tested. In addition, the
parameters that yielded optimal performance varied for each algorithm, especially with the number
of cases in the data stream. In terms of detecting the onset of seasonal influenza, only “unspecified
infection,” especially the counts from CNMC, clearly delineated influenza outbreaks out of the
eight available syndromic classifications. In three of five years, CNMC consistently flags earlier
(from 2 days up to 2 weeks earlier) than a multivariate analysis of all other DC hospitals.
Conclusions: When practitioners apply statistical detection algorithms to their own data, fine
tuning of parameters is necessary to improve overall sensitivity. With fined tuned algorithms, our
results suggest that emergency room based syndromic surveillance focusing on unspecified
infection cases in children is an effective way to determine the beginning of the influenza outbreak
and could serve as a trigger for more intensive surveillance efforts and initiate infection control
measures in the community.
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In a typical year, influenza results in 36,000 or more
deaths and more than 200,000 hospitalizations in the
United States alone. In addition to this human toll,
influenza is annually responsible for a total cost of over
$10 billion in the United States. A pandemic, or
worldwide outbreak of a new influenza virus such as
the AH1N1 virus that emerged in 2009, could dwarf this
impact by overwhelming our health and medical
capabilities, potentially resulting in hundreds of thou-
sands of deaths, millions of hospitalizations, and
hundreds of billions of dollars in direct and indirect
costs [1].
Epidemiological characteristics of both seasonal and
pandemic influenza suggest that syndromic surveillance
systems are likely to make an important contribution
beyond the capabilities of existing surveillance systems,
and thus enable a more effective public health response
to influenza outbreaks in a particular area. Indeed, a
number of studies have demonstrated the potential that
syndromic surveillance of influenza-like illness (ILI)
offers, and such systems are now common at the
national, state, and local levels [2]. Brownstein and
colleagues [3] show that children and infants presenting
to pediatric emergency departments (ED) with respira-
tory syndromes represent an early indicator of impend-
ing influenza morbidity and mortality, sometimes with
as much as a three week lead on EDs serving adults.
Lemay and colleagues [4] have found similar results in
Ottawa, Canada. Using data from New York City, Lu and
colleagues [5] have shown that monitoring both out-
patient and ED data can enhance detection of ILI
outbreaks. Lau and colleagues [6], Zheng and colleagues
[7], and Cooper and colleagues [8] have found similar
results in Hong Kong (China), New South Wales
(Australia), and the United Kingdom respectively.
Olson and colleagues [9] note that age-stratified analyses
of ED visits for fever and respiratory complaints offer the
potential earlier warning of the arrival of epidemic
influenza (compared to non-stratified analyses) because
they allow for detection of the characteristic age-shift of
pandemic influenza. Olson and colleagues also identi-
fied the impact of respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) in
children earlier than the flu season most years [9]. More
recently, Polgreen and colleagues [10] and Ginsberg and
colleagues [11] have suggested that data describing
internet searches for flu symptoms could also be useful
in detecting influenza outbreaks.
Statistical detection algorithms play a critical role in any
syndromic surveillance system, yet at times they are
applied without careful considerations of their statistical
properties and performance. For example, many syn-
dromic surveillance systems utilize “packaged” statistical
detection algorithms such as the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Early Aberrations
Reporting System (EARS) [12] with little control over
the parameters values used in those algorithms. How-
ever, selection of parameter values for an algorithm has a
large impact on the statistical performance of the
algorithm. In general, the performance of a statistical
detection algorithm is characterized by a tradeoff among
three factors: sensitivity, false positive rate, and time-
liness. Sensitivity represents an algorithm’s ability to flag
when an outbreak is really happening. The false positive
rate represents the likelihood it alarms incorrectly, when
an outbreak is not occurring, and timeliness refers to an
algorithm’s ability to flag as early as possible when an
outbreak is occurring.
The goals of this paper were two-fold. First, we studied
the performance of three commonly used statistical
detection algorithms against detecting simulated out-
breaks and previously “known” outbreaks detected in
data from the District of Columbia’s (DC) Department
of Health’s Emergency Room Syndromic Surveillance
System (ERSSS) [13]. The three algorithms included a
standard CUSUM, a version of the CUSUM based on
deviations from an exponentially weighted moving
average, and the multivariate CUSUM [13]. Our primary
aim in this analysis was to fine-tune the key parameters
in each detection algorithm to ensure optimal perfor-
mance in terms of reasonable trade-offs between
sensitivity, timeliness, and the false positive rate of the
algorithms. Additionally, we compared the three fine-
tuned versions of the algorithms to determine which
algorithm offered optimal performance for public health
practice and used the improved detection algorithms to
characterize the DC ERSSS’s performance with regard to
determining the onset of seasonal influenza outbreaks.
Second, we aimed to assess the performance of the DC
ERSSS. To do so, we compared a number of different
‘candidate’ syndromic surveillance systems within the
system to determine which offered the greatest benefit in
detecting the beginning of influenza outbreaks. Specifi-
cally, we examine the use of data from DC’s Children’s
National Medical Center (CNMC) as a sentinel syndro-
mic surveillance system and the use of different
symptom groups both individually and together to
determine which conditions are strongly correlated
with the beginning of influenza outbreaks. Some studies
have suggested that children’s symptoms are an espe-
cially sensitive indicator of the start of seasonal influenza
outbreaks. Children, and the elderly, are likely to be the
first victims of influenza due to their weaker immune
systems. Such results have been seen in the analysis of ER
surveillance data from both Boston [14] and New York
[9]. Given such high sensitivity to influenza, it is
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benefits that could be gleamed from a syndromic
surveillance system which focuses on data from hospitals
whose primary patients are children as we do here.
Methods
In the proceeding sections, we regard a flu outbreak as a
period characterized by a sudden increase in the number
of people with flu-like symptoms in a given location.
Since flu outbreaks in the United States usually occur
from December through April, we defined the “flu
season” to be December 1 through April 30 of the
subsequent calendar year and the “non-flu season” to be
the remainder of the year.
Data collection
Data for this analysis came from DC’sE R S S S .I nD C ,
emergency department logs from nine hospitals are sent
on a daily basis to the health department, where health
department staff code them on the basis of chief
complaint, recording the number of patients in each of
the following mutually exclusive syndromic categories:
death, sepsis, rash, respiratory illness, gastrointestinal
illness, unspecified infection, neurological illness, and
other complaints [15]. Coding is done hierarchically, in
the order given, so patients with two or more complaints
will be assigned the first one on the list. The data span
the calendar dates of September 11, 2001 to June 19,
2006, i.e. 1,743 days. We used only part of the data,
representing the time between September 11, 2001 and
May 17, 2004 (the period covered by our previous
research) as a test sample to determine the parameter
values in our fine-tuning analysis. The remaining data
were set aside until this was accomplished and the
complete data set used to validate our choices, as
described in more detail below.
With the exception of some of the first days of the
program, daily counts that were missing were imputed
using the imputation strategy described in the appendix.
After imputing the missing counts in the data, we
standardized the daily counts for each condition and
hospital by dividing the daily count by the mean number
of cases in the non-flu seasons.
Fine-tuning approach
To fine-tune the three algorithms defined below, we used
a two-pronged approach that aims to characterize the
performance of the algorithms in rigorous, yet practical
terms. First, we utilized a simulation study to estimate
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves and
determine which parameter values provided an optimal
trade-off between false positive rates and sensitivity of an
algorithm. Second, we used “known” outbreaks in the
DC Department of Health data to assess the timeliness
and sensitivity of an algorithm when faced with
detecting actual (non-simulated) outbreaks. Data avail-
able for the initial fine-tuning analysis spanned the
calendar dates from September 12, 2001 to May 17,
2004, i.e. 980 days
To perform the simulation study, we first created 970
datasets from the DC data with simulated outbreaks as
follows. Linearly increasing outbreaks were inserted into
each dataset such that x extra cases were inserted on day
one of the outbreak, 2× on day two, and 3× on day three.
The datasets each had a different start date for the
simulated 3-day outbreak, that is, the first dataset’s
outbreak began on September 12, 2001, the second’so n
September 13, 2001, and the 970th data set’so nM a y8 ,
2004. Since we use standardized daily counts, x was set
equal to values between zero and one where x = 0.50
would correspond to inserting multiples of half the
average number of daily cases in the non-flu seasons into
the data.
After creating the simulated datasets, we applied the
algorithms for a given set of parameter values and false
positive rate (between 0.001 and 0.05) to each one. We
then computed the sensitivity of the algorithm to detect
thesimulatedoutbreakbydaythreeoftheoutbreakinthe
non-flu seasons over all the simulated data sets. It was of
primary interest to understand how well the algorithms
did at detecting a simulated outbreak against a “normal”
background level of disease activity. No known outbreaks
occurred during the “normal” background periods. For
this reason we did not use data from the flu seasons,
December 1 to April 30, which likely contain actual
outbreaks in addition to the simulated ones, yielding
biased sensitivity rates. Thus, we computed the sensitivity
of the algorithm using the following formula:
Sensitivity
simulated datasets flagging by day in nonfl
=
#            3 u us e a s o n s
length of nonflu seasons
 
    
.
Finally, we plotted the sensitivity of the algorithm to flag
by day three in the non-flu seasons by the false positive
rate and computed the area under the sensitivity curve
(see below). The set of parameters of the algorithm that
gave the curve with the maximum area was considered to
be the optimal set of parameter values in the simulation
study since it gave the best balance between sensitivity
and false positive rates [16].
After selecting a small number of candidate values that
performed well under the ROC curve approach, we
proceeded to the second part of our fine-tuning analysis.
In the second part of our analysis, we assessed how well
the selected candidate values did at detecting previously
“known” outbreaks in the DC Department of Health
BMC Public Health 2009, 9:483 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/483
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rithms did at flagging the beginnings of the flu outbreaks
in 2002 and 2004 and at flagging gastrointestinal
outbreaks that occurred in three hospitals during the
winter of 2003.
We selected data from three hospitals for our fine-tuning
analysis based on the number of emergency department
admissions. Throughout this paper, we refer to these as
hospitals S (small), M (medium), and L (large). For each,
we used data for two conditions: unspecified infection
and gastrointestinal.
The results of our fine-tuning analysis are presented
primarily in two different graphical formats. The results
of the simulation studies are presented in terms of ROC
curves, as in Figures 1 and 2. For this format, the
horizontal axis represents the false positive rate and the
vertical axis represents the sensitivity rate. The curves
display the sensitivity rate on day three of the simulated
outbreak in the non-flu season that is achieved for each
pre-determined false positive rate. (The non-flu season is
used under the assumption that there are no actual
outbreaks during this period.) The different curves
correspond to different outbreak sizes or parameter
values.
The application of the detection algorithms to actual
data in comparison with known outbreaks is displayed
in a different format, as exemplified by Figures 3 and 4.
In this form, smoothed values for one or more data
streams (unspecified infection cases in hospital S in
Figure 3 and hospital L in Figure 4) are presented in
terms of a curve. The flagging of the detection algorithms
i sr e p r e s e n t e db ys y m b o l sp l o t t e da c c o r d i n gt ot h ed a y
they flagged on the horizontal axis and the value of the
test statistic (e.g. CUSUM) on that date on the vertical
axis. The flagging times are also represented along the
time axis with vertical lines that are color coded to the
symbol. Note that the vertical axis is on a square root
scale because of its variance stabilizing properties.
“Winter” is used in these graphs and throughout the
remainder of the paper as a shorthand for November 1
of the previous year to April 1 of the year displayed or
discussed. This definition, which differs from our
definition of the “flu season,” was chosen simply to
ensure that the figures focus on the part of the data
where flu outbreaks actually began during the study
period.
Statistical detection algorithms
We utilize three detection algorithms in this study. The
first, the CUSUM (for “cumulative summation”)a l g o -
rithm, monitors the daily statistic Si which is defined by
the recursive formula
SS X k ii i =+ − − − max( , ( ) ). 0 1 μ
where Xi denotes the observed daily count on day i, μ
denotes the overall mean daily count estimated from the
data, and k is an off-set parameter set by the user [17,18].
This statistic cumulates positive deviations from the
average in order to detect small but persistent increases
in cases. The CUSUM algorithm alarms or flags at time
ˆ τ =i n f { i : Si >h} where h is computed empirically to
g u a r a n t e eaf i x e df a l s ep o s i t i v er a t e( s p e c i f i e db yt h eu s e r )
in the non-flu seasons. In our analysis, we focus on fine-
tuning the user-specified value of k. The parameter k is a
Figure 1
ROC curves for detection of a simulated outbreak by
day 3 in the non-flu seasons in hospital S for
unspecified infection using the CUSUM algorithm.
Dashed and solid lines correspond to CUSUM algorithms
with k =1 . 5a n dk = 0.5, respectively.
Figure 2
ROC curves for detection of a simulated outbreak by
day 3 in the non-flu seasons in hospital L for
unspecified infection using the CUSUM algorithm.
Dashed and solid lines correspond to CUSUM algorithms
with k =1 . 5a n dk = 0.5, respectively.
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CUSUM as a sequential likelihood ratio test for a shift δ
in the mean parameter of a normal distribution. Under
standard assumptions, k is usually set to δ/2, for a one-
time shift in level that must be detected quickly. In
syndromic surveillance however, we typically expect
outbreaks that increase in size over time, so the standard
theory does not determine an optimal k.I n s t e a d ,k must
be determined empirically using methods such as those
described below. The theory does, however, suggest that
Figure 3
Daily flags from the CUSUM algorithm for k = 0.25, 0.50, 1, 1.5, and 2 applied to hospital S’s unspecified
infection daily counts during the winter of 2002. Green lines show the smoothed values for unspecified infection daily
counts from the given hospital. Flagging times are also represented along the time axis with vertical lines that are color coded
to the symbol. Note that the vertical axis is on a square root scale because of its variance stabilizing properties.
Figure 4
Daily flags from the CUSUM algorithm for k = 0.25, 0.50, 1, 1.5, and 2 applied to hospital L’su n s p e c i f i e d
infection daily counts during the winter of 2004. Green lines show the smoothed values for unspecified infection daily
counts from the given hospital. Flagging times are also represented along the time axis with vertical lines that are color coded
to the symbol. Note that the vertical axis is on a square root scale because of its variance stabilizing properties.
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(page number not for citation purposes)choice of k matters a great deal. If k is too small, the
algorithm will detect every flu c t u a t i o ni nt h ed a t aw h i l ei f
itis toolarge,thealgorithmwillnotdetectanythingat all.
The CUSUM based on deviations from an exponentially
weighted moving average, which we refer to throughout
as EXPO, adds one additional step to the CUSUM
algorithm described above [13]. First, the EXPO algo-
rithm predicts the daily counts, Xi, using an exponen-
tially weighted moving average. Specifically, it defines
zX z ii i =+ − − λλ () 1 1
where 0 ≤ l ≤ 1 is a user-specified parameter and
represents the degree of smoothing that is to be done in
the data (i.e. smaller values correspond to more
smoothing). The algorithm then monitors the differ-
ences between the actual and predicted counts using the
statistic Si which is defined by the following recursive
formula
SS X z k ii i i =+ − − − max( , ( ) ). 0 1
As with CUSUM, the EXPO algorithm flags at time
ˆ τ =i n f { i : Si >h}w h e r eh is computed empirically to
guarantee a fixed false positive rate (user-specified) in
the non-flu seasons. In contrast to CUSUM, EXPO
should allow for more sensitive detection when out-
breaks appear against a linearly increasing background
pattern. With EXPO, two parameters must be fine-tuned:
k and l. Both parameters are supplied by users in this
algorithm and their selected values will have a large
impact on the statistical performance of the algorithm.
Lastly, we worked to fine-tune the multivariate CUSUM
algorithm, which we refer to as MV CUSUM. The MV
CUSUM was developed for monitoring multiple streams
of data on a daily basis (e.g., streams of data from more
than one hospital or streams of data from more than one
c o n d i t i o nw i t h i nah o s p i t a l )[ 1 9 ]a n dc a no f f e rg r e a t e r
utility when an outbreak is likely to influence the daily
counts of more than one symptom group. It follows the
same logic as the standard CUSUM except that now daily
counts are represented by a vector Xi whose dimension is
p×1where p represents the number of streams being
analyzed together. We define
SS X i ii i  if  =+ − > − () ( / ) , 1 1 kC C k i
and Si = 0 if Ci ≤ k where
Cii i =+ + −
−
− {( )’ ( )}
/ SX SX ii 1
1
1
12 Σ
and Σ
-1 is the estimated variance-covariance matrix for
the p streams of data being analyzed using only daily
counts from the non-flu seasons. The MV CUSUM
algorithm flags at time ˆ τ =i n f { i : Ci >h}. For the MV
CUSUM algorithm, k is the parameter of interest for fine-
tuning purposes. It is user-specified and its value will
impact the statistical performance of the algorithm.
Analysis of DC influenza data
In order to evaluate the ERSSS data’s ability to determine
the beginning of the seasonal influenza outbreak in DC,
we selected a number of ‘candidate’ syndromic surveil-
lance systems within the system and compared how well
each ‘candidate’ system did at flagging the beginning of
the flu season. Additionally, we compared each one to
CDC’s sentinel physician data, which is based on a
network of physicians reporting each week on the
proportion of cases they have seen that have influenza-
like illness (ILI). Our ‘candidate’ systems included both
univariate and multivariate versions. Initially, we exam-
ined how well each of the eight syndrome categories did
alone at flagging the beginning of the flu season. Then,
based on the initial performance, we focused in on the
ability of unspecified infection and respiratory categories
to detect the start of the flu season both within a single
hospital and taken together across hospitals.
Finally, we examined how well CNMC did versus all the
others when using just unspecified infection, just
respiratory, and both categories together. For the CDC’s
sentinel physician data, data is available only on a
national and regional basis, so we choose to use the
South Atlantic region, which includes the District of
Columbia (CDC, various years) in our comparisons.
Also, all the comparisons in the influenza analysis used
fine-tuned versions of the algorithms based on the
results from the fine-tuning analysis.
Results
Fine-tuning Analysis
As described above, we began our study by fine-tuning
the k parameter found in the standard, univariate
CUSUM algorithm. We studied the performance of a
large range of k values beginning with the performance
of the univariate CUSUM for k = 2, 2.5, 3,..., 6. However,
these values performed very poorly. Thus, we closely
examined the performance of values of k between 0.25
and 2. In general, we found that the following rule of
thumb worked well for applying the univariate CUSUM:
If a hospital has a mean non-flu season daily rate of less
than five cases per day, k = 1.5 is optimal for
standardized data. If a hospital has a mean non-flu
season daily rate of greater than five cases per day, k =0 . 5
is optimal. Thus, according to Table 1 which shows the
mean daily number of cases in the non-flu seasons for
each hospital and condition, k=1.5 was optimal for
BMC Public Health 2009, 9:483 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/483
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was optimal for all other cases.
Figures 1 and 2 show the results from the ROC curve
analysis for hospitals S and L and unspecified infection.
Dashed lines represent k = 1.5 and solid lines represent
k = 0.5. The different colored lines represent different
outbreak sizes from x = 0.25 to x = 1. As expected, as x
increases, the sensitivity of the CUSUM algorithm for
both values of k increases. As the outbreak size increases,
the outbreak is easier to detect for a given false positive
rate. In Figure 1 (Hospital S), the dashed lines
corresponding to k = 1.5 clearly dominate over their
partner solid line for each value of x. Conversely, in
Figure 2 (Hospital L) which is a larger hospital and has
mean daily rate of cases in the non-flu seasons for
u n s p e c i f i e di n f e c t i o ne q u a lt o2 8 . 1 1 ,t h es o l i dl i n e s
corresponding to k = 0.5 clearly dominate over the
dashed lines of k = 1.5 for each x.
Figures 3 and 4 show the performance of the CUSUM
algorithm for k = 0.25, 0.50, 1.00, 1.50, 2.00 for
detecting previously “known” flu outbreaks in hospital
S in the winter of 2002 and hospital L in the winter of
2004. Again, for hospital S (Figure 3) which has a small
mean daily rate of cases in the non-flu seasons (e.g.
3.48), larger values of k (e.g k =1 . 5a n d2 )d ot h eb e s ta t
indicating the beginning of the flu outbreaks by flagging
the earliest. Conversely for hospital L (Figure 4), smaller
value of k (e.g. k =0 . 5a n d1 )w e r et h ef i r s tt of l a gt h e
beginning of the flu outbreak in 2004. Taken together,
the results from Figures 1 through 4 suggest that k =1 . 5
is optimal for hospitals with mean daily non-flu season
counts of less than 5 and k = 0.5 is optimal for hospitals
with mean daily non-flu season counts of greater than 5.
Repeating the steps above, we began fine-tuning the k
and l parameters of the EXPO algorithm using the ROC
curve approach. Searching for optimal values of (k, l)
involved an iterative process of first fine-tuning l for k =
0.5 and 1.5 and then fixing l between 0.1 and 0.5 and
varying k. This process was repeated until optimal
performance was detected for values of k between 0.25
and 0.5 and values of l between 0.2 and 0.4. Interest-
i n g l y ,w ef o u n dt h a tt h es a m es e to fv a l u e sf o r( k, l)d i d
well for all hospitals and conditions. However, we also
found that there was far less of a distinction between the
groups of selected candidate values for the EXPO
algorithm than we found for the selected candidate
values in the CUSUM algorithm (Figure 5). The top two
sets of values for (k, l) were (0.25,0.20) and (k, l)=
(0.25,0.40) with areas under of the curve of 0.0484 and
0.0485, respectively. In terms of detecting a previously
“known” flu outbreak, (k, l) = (0.25, 0.20) only flags the
beginning of the flu outbreak a couple days before (0.25,
0.40) for hospital L in the winter of 2002 (Figure 6).
Based on our findings for all three hospitals and both
conditions, we recommend using (k, l) = (0.25, 0.20) for
the D.C. data since it outperforms (k, l) = (0.25, 0.40)
even if slightly.
Finally, we applied our two-pronged fine-tuning
approach to the k parameter in the MV CUSUM
algorithm. We found that k is sensitive to the number of
data streams on which the algorithm is applied. For
example, when applied to three streams of data (daily
standardized counts from hospitals S, M and L for
unspecified infection or gastrointestinal), k =7w a sa n
optimal value (Figure 7). On the other hand, when
applied to six streams of data (daily standardized counts
from hospitals S, M and L for BOTH unspecified infection
and gastrointestinal), k =9w a so p t i m a l( F i g u r e8 ) .W h e n
assessing the performance of the MV CUSUM algorithm
for detecting “known” flu outbreaks in the winters of
2002and2004fork=6,7,and8forthreestreamsofdata,
we found that k =6hadaslightadvantageoverk =7inthe
winter of 2002 while k = 8 did poorly at predicting the
beginning of the flu outbreak( F i g u r e9 ) .I nt h ew i n t e r
2004, all values did similarly well (Figure 10). Given the
optimality of k =7i nt h eR O Ca p p r o a c h ,w es e l e c t e dk =7
as the value for the MV CUSUM when applied to three
s t r e a m so fd a t ai nt h i sd a t as e t .
Table 1: Mean number of daily cases in the non-flu seasons for
hospitals S, M, and L by unspecified infection and gastrointestinal
symptoms
Hospital S Hospital M Hospital L
Unspecified Infection 3.5 4.8 28.1
Gastrointestinal 9.0 21.9 14.7
Figure 5
ROC curves for detection of a simulated outbreak by
day 3 in the non-flu seasons in hospital M for
unspecified infection using various values of (k, l)i n
the EXPO algorithm.
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analyses above on hospitals S, M, and L for unspecified
infection and gastrointestinal data using the complete
DC Department of Health dataset with daily counts from
September 11, 2001 to June 19, 2006. The results for the
univariate CUSUM and EXPO algorithms remained the
same. However, the optimal parameter values for the MV
CUSUM were different for the updated data. Two
different values of k were now optimal for three streams
of data. For three streams of gastrointestinal, k =8w a s
optimal while for three streams of unspecified infection,
k = 7 remained optimal. For six streams of data, k =1 0
outperformed all other values of k. These results suggest
that the MV CUSUM is sensitive to small changes in the
data and thus, that fine-tuning the algorithm on an
annual basis would be prudent.
We further studied the robustness of our results by
rerunning the analyses above on three different hospitals
for unspecified infection and respiratory daily counts.
Figure 6
Flags from the EXPO algorithm for various values of (k, l) applied to Hospital L’s unspecified infection daily
counts during the winter of 2002. Green lines show the smoothed values for unspecified infection daily counts from the
given hospital. Flagging times are also represented along the time axis with vertical lines that are color coded to the symbol.
Note that the vertical axis is on a square root scale because of its variance stabilizing properties.
Figure 7
ROC curves for detection of a simulated outbreak by
day 3 in the non-flu seasons using various values of k
in the MV CUSUM and applying the algorithm to
three streams of unspecified infection data from
h o s p i t a l sS ,M ,a n dL .
Figure 8
ROC curves for detection of a simulated outbreak by
day 3 in the non-flu seasons using various values of k
in the MV CUSUM and applying the algorithm to six
streams of data (unspecified infection and
gastrointestinal from hospitals S, M, and L).
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remained the same while the MV CUSUM optimal values
for k changed. For three streams of unspecified infection,
k = 5 was optimal and for three streams of respiratory,
k = 6 was optimal.
Other studies have found a slight advantage to the MV
CUSUM algorithm when applied to multiple streams of
data [19]. We investigated whether this advantage
continued after the algorithms’ parameters had been
fine-tuned. In order to assess this, we compared the fine-
tuned versions of the CUSUM, EXPO, and MV CUSUM
algorithms on three and six streams of data. When
extending the univariate CUSUM and EXPO algorithms
to three or six streams of data, the false positive rate of
the algorithms applied to any one stream must be
decreased to maintain a consistent daily false positive
rate over multiple streams, i.e. the probability that one
or more data streams will flag on a given day. Thus, using
standard rules for multiple testing, we decrease the
individual stream false positive rates to 00 1 3 . and
00 1 6 . when applying the algorithm to three and six
streams of data, respectively and considered the extended
versions of the algorithm to have flag if they flagged on
any single stream with the reduced false positive rate.
Figures 11 and 12 display the results of applying the fine-
tuned algorithms to three streams of data, three steams
of unspecified infection and three streams of gastro-
intestinal from hospitals S, M, and L, respectively. For
unspecified infection (Figure 11), the application of
EXPO to multiple data streams simultaneously out-
performed both versions of the CUSUM. For gastro-
intestinal (Figure 12), the MV CUSUM outperformed the
others. When applying the algorithms to six streams of
data (e.g. unspecified infection + gastrointestinal data
from all three hospitals), the MV CUSUM outperformed
the EXPO and CUSUM algorithms (Figure 13).
We also compared the three algorithms by checking
them against the “known” flu outbreaks that occurred in
DC during the winters of 2002 and 2004. Figure 14
demonstrates that the MV CUSUM outperformed EXPO
at detecting the beginning of the flu outbreak in the
Figure 9
Flags from the MV CUSUM algorithm for various
values of k applied to three streams of unspecified
infection data from hospitals S, M, and L during the
winter of 2002. Orange, red and green lines show the
smoothed values for unspecified infection daily counts from
hospitals S, M, and L, respectively. Flagging times are also
represented along the time axis with vertical lines that are
color coded to the symbol. Note that the vertical axis is on a
square root scale because of its variance stabilizing
properties.
Figure 10
Flags from the MV CUSUM algorithm for various
values of k applied to three streams of unspecified
infection data from hospitals S, M, and L during the
winter of 2004. Orange, red and green lines show the
smoothed values for unspecified infection daily counts from
hospitals S, M, and L, respectively. Black sections indicate
missing data. Flagging times are also represented along the
time axis with vertical lines that are color coded to the
symbol. Note that the vertical axis is on a square root scale
because of its variance stabilizing properties.
Figure 11
ROC curves for detection of a simulated outbreak by
day 3 in the non-flu seasons for CUSUM, EXPO, and
MV CUSUM when applied to three streams of
unspecified infection from hospitals S, M, and L.
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(page number not for citation purposes)winter of 2002. The same was true for the winter of 2004
(Figure 15). The MV CUSUM is the first algorithm to flag
the beginning of the flu outbreak in both years. Contrary
to the results from the ROC curve approach, EXPO did
poorly at flagging the beginning of the flu outbreak.
Taken together, these results strongly suggest that there is
an advantage to using MV CUSUM to detect the
beginning of the flu outbreak.
Analysis of DC influenza data
Our previous research suggested that of the eight
syndrome groups available in the DC ERSSS,
“unspecified infection” was most sensitive to determin-
ing the onset of the seasonal influenza outbreak in
Washington DC. This was confirmed through a series of
new analyses of the sort illustrated in Figures 16 and 17.
In these graphs, smoothed values for the number of
Figure 12
ROC curves for detection of a simulated outbreak by
day 3 in the non-flu seasons for CUSUM, EXPO, and
MV CUSUM when applied to three streams of
gastrointestinal data from hospitals S, M, and L.
Figure 13
ROC curves for detection of a simulated outbreak by
day 3 in the non-flu seasons for CUSUM, EXPO, and
MV CUSUM when applied to gastrointestinal and
unspecified infection counts from hospitals S, M,
and L.
Figure 14
Daily flags from the fine-tuned CUSUM, EXPO, and
MV CUSUM algorithms when applied to three
streams of unspecified infection data from hospitals
S, M, and L during the winter of 2002. Orange, red and
green lines show the smoothed values for unspecified
infection daily counts from hospitals S, M, and L, respectively.
Flagging times are also represented along the time axis with
vertical lines that are color coded to the symbol. Note that
the vertical axis is on a square root scale because of its
variance stabilizing properties.
Figure 15
Daily flags from the fine-tuned CUSUM, EXPO, and
MV CUSUM algorithms when applied to three
streams of unspecified infection data from hospitals
S, M, and L during the winter of 2004. Orange, red and
green lines show the smoothed values for unspecified
infection daily counts from hospitals S, M, and L, respectively.
Black sections indicate missing data. Flagging times are also
represented along the time axis with vertical lines that are
color coded to the symbol. Note that the vertical axis is on a
square root scale because of its variance stabilizing
properties.
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Daily flags from the fine-tuned CUSUM and EXPO algorithms when applied to unspecified infection data from
7 hospitals during the winter of 2002. Smoothed values for the number of unspecified infection cases are shown for seven
hospitals, each with a different color curve. The flagging of the detection algorithms is represented by symbols (+ for CUSUM,
o for EXPO) plotted according to the day they flagged on the horizontal axis and along different fixed values on the vertical axis
to help distinguish more clearly between the algorithms being compared.
Figure 17
Daily flags from the fine-tuned CUSUM and EXPO algorithms when applied to respiratory infection data from
7 hospitals during the winter of 2002. Smoothed values for the number of respiratory cases are shown for seven hospitals,
each with a different color curve. The flagging of the detection algorithms is represented by symbols (+ for CUSUM, o for
EXPO) plotted according to the day they flagged on the horizontal axis and along different fixed values on the vertical axis to
help distinguish more clearly between the algorithms being compared.
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(page number not for citation purposes)unspecified infection (Figure 16) and respiratory com-
plaints (Figure 17) are shown for multiple hospitals. The
flagging of the univariate detection algorithms is
represented by symbols (+ for CUSUM, o for EXPO)
plotted according to the day they flagged on the
horizontal axis and along different fixed values on the
vertical axis to help distinguish more clearly between
the algorithms being compared. Figure 16 shows that the
number of unspecified infection cases in most of the
hospitals rises gradually through January, and both
algorithms begin to flag, particularly the CUSUM, and
do so consistently, starting early in January. On the other
hand respiratory symptoms, shown for seven hospitals
in Figure 17, do not exhibit such a strong increase and
the univariate algorithms do not flag consistently.
Indeed, some of the hospitals flag sporadically in
November and December, arguably before the influenza
outbreak began in DC that year. The other symptom
groups available in the ERSSS exhibited even less of a
consistent signal for seasonal influenza than respiratory
symptoms.
Our previous analyses also suggested that analysis of
unspecified infection counts from CNMC as a more
sensitive indicator of the beginning of influenza out-
breaks than unspecified infection data from other
hospitals [13]. To confirm this, we compared the
performance of the univariate and multivariate detection
algorithms on unspecified infection and/or respiratory
data from CNMC with a MV CUSUM analysis of
unspecified and respiratory cases at the other six
hospitals in DC’s ERSSS. The results for winter 2002
are shown in Figure 18. The smoothed number of cases
of both symptom groups for all seven hospitals is shown
in the solid and dotted color-coded lines. The flagging of
the detection algorithms is represented by black (for
CNMC) and red (all other hospitals) symbols (+ for
unspecified infection, o for respiratory, and Δ for MV
unspecified infection and respiratory). As in Figures 8
and 9, the unspecified infection cases (+) flag earlier and
more consistently than the respiratory cases (o). In
addition, unspecified infection plus respiratory data (Δ)
is not consistently more effective than unspecified
Figure 18
Daily flags from potential Children’s Hospital surveillance systems (black symbols) vs. all other hospitals (red
symbols) plotted along with CDC sentinel physician data for winter 2002. The smoothed number of cases is shown
in the solid (unspecified infection) and dotted lines (respiratory complaints) and color-coded by hospital. The flagging of the
detection algorithms is represented by black (for CNMC) and red (all other hospitals) symbols (+ for unspecified infection, o
for respiratory, and Δ for MV unspecified infection and respiratory). The percentage of cases seen by sentinel physicians each
week who have ILI is plotted on the right-hand vertical axis. The vertical line corresponds to the first date on which the
sentinel physician data exceeds 2.5%, the CDC threshold on the national level for declaring the flu season.
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(page number not for citation purposes)infection alone (+). Whatever symptoms groups are
analyzed however, the CNMC data (black symbols) flag
before the comparable data from the other six hospitals
(red symbols).
In order to evaluate the ERSSS data’s ability to determine
the beginning of the seasonal influenza outbreak in DC,
we compared it to CDC’s sentinel physician reports of
influenza-like illness (ILI). The percentage of cases seen
by sentinel physicians each week who have ILI is plotted
on the right-hand vertical axis of Figure 18. The vertical
line corresponds to the first date on which the sentinel
physician data exceeds 2.5%. CDC uses this level as the
threshold on the national level, but its application to
o n er e g i o ni sa na p p r o x i m a t i o n .I nF i g u r e1 8( 2 0 0 2 ) ,
note that the local ERSSS data flag about two weeks
before the CDC sentinel physician data reached the 2.5%
threshold.
Figures 19, 20, 21 and 22 present similar analyses for the
winters of 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Table 2
summarizes the results. The first row is based on an
analysis of unspecified infection cases presenting at
CNMC only, and the second row is based on a MV
CUSUM analysis of unspecified infection cases at the
other six hospitals in the analysis. The third row is based
on the CDC’s sentinel physician data. The date on which
the first system alerted each year is indicated with bold,
underlined type. In 2003, there was no clear flu outbreak
in Washington and both the CNMC and other DC
hospitals note this by not having any flags for the start of
a flu season. In 2004, the ERSSS and CDC data flag at
around the same time. The pattern for 2005 is similar to
2002, that is, the local ERSSS data have about a two
week advantage. The data for 2006 are more ambiguous.
The CDC sentinel physician systems flagged about two
w e e k sb e f o r eu n s p e c i f i e di n f e c t i o ni nC N M Ci nF e b r u -
ary, but the number of respiratory cases at the other
hospitals was increasing through December and January,
so it is difficult to say when the influenza outbreak
actually started in DC that year. Indeed, the state
epidemiologist’s report to CDC fluctuated between
“sporadic” and “local” from November 12 through
May 20, with “no activity” reported for the week ending
February 18, when the ERSSS and sentinel physician
data were peaking [20].
Figure 19
Daily flags from potential Children’s Hospital surveillance systems (black symbols) vs. all other hospitals (red
symbols) plotted along with CDC sentinel physician data for winter 2003. The smoothed number of cases is shown
in the solid (unspecified infection) and dotted lines (respiratory complaints) and color-coded by hospital. The flagging of the
detection algorithms is represented by black (for CNMC) and red (all other hospitals) symbols (+ for unspecified infection, o
for respiratory, and Δ for MV unspecified infection and respiratory). The percentage of cases seen by sentinel physicians each
week who have ILI is plotted on the right-hand vertical axis. The vertical line corresponds to the first date on which the
sentinel physician data exceeds 2.5%, the CDC threshold on the national level for declaring the flu season.
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Daily flags from potential Children’s Hospital surveillance systems (black symbols) vs. all other hospitals (red
symbols) plotted along with CDC sentinel physician data for winter 2004. The smoothed number of cases is shown
in the solid (unspecified infection) and dotted lines (respiratory complaints) and color-coded by hospital. The flagging of the
detection algorithms is represented by black (for CNMC) and red (all other hospitals) symbols (+ for unspecified infection, o
for respiratory, and Δ for MV unspecified infection and respiratory). The percentage of cases seen by sentinel physicians each
week who have ILI is plotted on the right-hand vertical axis. The vertical line corresponds to the first date on which the
sentinel physician data exceeds 2.5%, the CDC threshold on the national level for declaring the flu season.
Figure 21
Daily flags from potential Children’s Hospital surveillance systems (black symbols) vs. all other hospitals (red
symbols) plotted along with CDC sentinel physician data for winter 2005. The smoothed number of cases is shown
in the solid (unspecified infection) and dotted lines (respiratory complaints) and color-coded by hospital. The flagging of the
detection algorithms is represented by black (for CNMC) and red (all other hospitals) symbols (+ for unspecified infection, o
for respiratory, and Δ for MV unspecified infection and respiratory). The percentage of cases seen by sentinel physicians each
week who have ILI is plotted on the right-hand vertical axis. The vertical line corresponds to the first date on which the
sentinel physician data exceeds 2.5%, the CDC threshold on the national level for declaring the flu season.
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consistently flags earlier (from 2 days up to 2 weeks
earlier) than a multivariate analysis of all other DC
hospitals. In 2006, the data for the other hospitals does
not flag at all. These data suggest that the DC ERSSS,
specifically unspecified infection data from CNMC, is
adept at detecting the beginning of the outbreak in
Washington.
Discussion
Our results suggest that careful analysis of unspecified
infection cases, and especially those from CNMC, was
useful in detecting the beginning of influenza outbreaks
in the District of Columbia. Comparing the earliest dates
at which various systems flag, we found that for
unspecified infection, CNMC consistently flags earlier
than any of the other six hospitals. It alone also regularly
flags before a multivariate analysis of the other six
hospitals in our analysis. In addition, we found that
although the respiratory syndrome group also provides
information about influenza, it does not appear to add
anything to the information contained in unspecified
infection. These results suggest that the CNMC unspeci-
fied infection data be monitored more closely than
others, and a flag in this system be regarded as having
higher predictive value.
When we compared unspecified infection cases in
CNMC and in the other DC hospitals (using optimal
Figure 22
Daily flags from potential Children’s Hospital surveillance systems (black symbols) vs. all other hospitals (red
symbols) plotted along with CDC sentinel physician data for winter 2006. The smoothed number of cases is shown
in the solid (unspecified infection) and dotted lines (respiratory complaints) and color-coded by hospital. The flagging of the
detection algorithms is represented by black (for CNMC) and red (all other hospitals) symbols (+ for unspecified infection, o
for respiratory, and Δ for MV unspecified infection and respiratory). The percentage of cases seen by sentinel physicians each
week who have ILI is plotted on the right-hand vertical axis. The vertical line corresponds to the first date on which the
sentinel physician data exceeds 2.5%, the CDC threshold on the national level for declaring the flu season.
Table 2: Date of first detection for Children’s National Medical
Center (CNMC) and six other DC hospitals and CDC’s sentinel
physician surveillance system (South Atlantic states) over four
years with the first system to flag each year highlighted in bold
and underlined and the number of days delay for the other
systems shown below the date of flagging
Year
Surveillance
system
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
CNMC Dec 31 – Nov 24
+2
Jan 2 Feb 27
+23
Other DC
hospitals
Jan 4
+4
– Dec 8
+14
Jan 4
+2
-
CDC sentinel
physicians
Jan 26
+26
Feb 1 Nov 22 Jan 22
+20
Feb 4
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sentinel physician data for the South Atlantic states for
four years in which there was a discernable influenza
outbreak in DC (2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006), we found
that in two of these four years, syndromic surveillance
from CNMC outperformed the other two systems, and in
one year it flagged only two days after the CDC system. It
is important to note that the CDC sentinel physician
data system has a built in delay of 1-2 weeks, for
example, data for patients seen in Week 12 in 2007
(March 18 - March 24) was published on March 31.
Given this delay, analysis of the DC ERSSS provides a
substantial advantage for real-time surveillance, particu-
larly when using data from CNMC. Similar results were
seen in an analysis of ER surveillance data from Boston
[14] and New York [9], supporting the idea that
children’s symptoms are an especially sensitive indicator
of the state of seasonal influenza.
These results are subject to limitations. Our method for
setting the false positive rate assumes that there were no
true outbreaks during the non-flu seasons. The cut-off
value of five cases for the mean standardized daily
counts in the non-flu seasons for the univariate CUSUM
was developed after observing that 0.5 worked well for
hospital C (used in the sensitivity analysis) which had a
mean standardized count of 5.3 cases for respiratory
infection while for hospital A with a mean standardized
count of 4.8 for unspecified infection, 1.5 was superior.
While not exact, this rule of thumb worked very well in
the DC data and should only be used as a starting point
for other data sets. We also acknowledge that we cannot
generalize our results for the univariate CUSUM beyond
a mean standardized count of 28.1 cases (e.g. the largest
stream of daily counts available to us in the DC data).
Similar caution must be taken when trying to extrapolate
our results for the EXPO and MVCUSUM algorithms. In
addition, the detection algorithms we used do not
account for day of the week effects. According to our
previous analyses [13], these do exist in the data but are
smaller than in many other data sources. Adding day of
the week terms to a prediction model or pre-filtering the
data to remove day of the week effect would presumably
result in a greater signal to noise ratio in the data, but
not fundamentally change its nature. Thus increasing the
sophistication of the detection algorithms by accounting
for day of the week effects might improve their
performance, but it is unlikely to alter the conclusions
of this paper about the need for tuning the parameters.
Furthermore, our simulation studies use a relatively
simple linear pattern to describe the simulated outbreak.
While actual outbreaks may have a very different pattern,
the outbreaks of most public health concern, including
seasonal and pandemic influenza, will grow in size over
time, the general pattern that our simulations represent.
More complex patterns might vary the specific results but
again will not the key finding concerning the need to
fine-tune parameters in statistical detection algorithms.
The primary limitation of the influenza analysis is that it
is based on only four influenza outbreaks in one city,
one of which was atypical. It should be replicated in
other areas to confirm the potential benefit that careful
monitoring of data from CNMC can have in a local area’s
syndromic surveillance system. The use of CDC sentinel
surveillance data for the South Atlantic area, rather than
for DC, is also a limitation. Unfortunately no more
specific data of this type, or viral surveillance data, are
available for the District.
Conclusions
The results of this evaluation have implications for DC’s
ERSSS and for syndromic surveillance systems in general.
First, the analysis shows that the choice of a detection
algorithm’s parameters matters in terms of statistical
performance (here, assessed via sensitivity analysis and
detection of known outbreaks). For the standard
CUSUM algorithm, the optimal choice of k depended
on the average number of cases per day outside the flu
seasons. For the CUSUM based on deviations from an
exponentially-weighted moving average (referred to as
EXPO in this report), choosing k = 0.25 and l =0 . 2 0w a s
optimal, regardless of average number of cases. For the
multivariate CUSUM, the choice of the k (defined
differently than the k in the standard CUSUM) was
much more sensitive to the data, and especially the
number of data streams.
Although we explored only a limited set of detection
algorithms and parameter values, our results suggest that
simply using “canned” statistical detection algorithms
with preset parameters may not give the optimal results
for a given algorithm or data set. Rather, data need to be
examined regularly using approaches similar to those
above (perhaps with the consultation of a statistician) to
fine-tune the parameters in the statistical detection
algorithms to the data upon which they are being
applied. Alternatively, Tokars and colleagues [21]
explore how CDC’s EARS algorithms can be improved
by changing baseline periods and stratifying by day of
the week.
The second conclusion is that, comparing the three
detection algorithms applied to three or six data streams
simultaneously in simulation studies, the multivariate
CUSUM algorithm out-performed the two univariate
methods in two of three settings examined in the
simulation study, and in the detection of the beginning
of the flu outbreak when applied to real data. The EXPO
BMC Public Health 2009, 9:483 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/483
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d e t e c t i n gl i n e a r l yi n c r e a s i n go u t b r e a k si nu n s p e c i f i e d
infection data from three hospitals. These results were
also found in [19]. The results show that it is difficult to
identify any particular characteristics of the data that
would suggest that one algorithm is uniformly better
than another. A system could be “tuned” to for different
outbreak types, but that would require advance knowl-
edge of what next season’s flu would look like, which is
clearly not available.
The optimal parameters and detection algorithms that
we found in this analysis, of course, apply only to the
particular data sets analyzed and the types of outbreaks
studied (namely, linearly increasing outbreaks). The
results cannot be generalized to other data streams and
especially to other health departments. However, the
conclusion that the parameters need to be tuned to the
data does apply in general. Fine-tuning parameters on an
annual or biannual basis would be prudent for any
Emergency Room Syndromic Surveillance System.
In comparison with limitations of the ability of
syndromic surveillance to detect bioterrorist events in a
timely way unless they are very large and thus obvious
[22], the analysis in this paper suggests that the most
important contribution of syndromic surveillance to
public health practice may be for natural disease
outbreaks, such as seasonal and pandemic flu. The
“situational awareness” that these systems provides can
be quite valuable [23]. Indeed, in August 2009, the U.S.
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technol-
ogy recommended that CDC aggregate real-time data
from existing emergency department syndromic surveil-
lance systems as a way to monitor the development and
spread of the 2009-H1N1 influenza virus [24]. In
addition, the World Health Organization now suggests
monitoring outpatient or emergency department visits
for acute respiratory illness, absenteeism rates from
schools or work places, and other approaches that
could be regarded as syndromic surveillance in countries
in which 2009-H1N1 has already been established [25].
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Appendix
The following imputation strategy was used to impute
missing data. Let Xt represent the daily count for a given
hospital and symptom group. In order to stabilize the
variance, imputation was done in the square root scale,
i.e. in terms of Zt = √Xt.D e f i n eμ as the average value of
Zt over all observed values and s as the standard
deviation of Zt over the same period. Similarly, define
Dj as the day of the week effect for day j (for Monday j =
1, and so on) which equals the average of Zt (for all days
j) - μ.F i n a l l y ,l e te t be a random variable from a Normal
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation s.F o r
each missing value, we first calculate Yt as the exponen-
tially weighted moving average based on the most recent
observations of Zt. Transforming back to the original
scale, the imputed value for day t is:
XY D e tt j t =+ + () .
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